

two years ago when «detaching» prices for energy sources for Belarus from Russian domestic prices. Everyone should remember this. Therefore, it is absolutely wrong to say that we are supporting a particular political figure at all costs.» This way Putin recalled the «gas war» of 2004, forgotten by many, when Belarus became the first, long before Ukraine, to experience Moscow's special weapon — interruption of the natural gas supply. A few days earlier Alexander Lukashenko also recalled that «gas war» in a large interview to the national TV channels. He could hardly hide his apprehension speaking of the inevitable growth of gas prices and the need to convert to resource-saving technologies and mitigating power dependency on Russia. Can this be a pure coincidence?

Just a small flashback: after the two presidents' December meeting in Sochi there were talks of Lukashenko's receiving Moscow's approval to run for his third presidency not for free, but in return for a promise to trade off BelTransGaz shares. The gas transporting system of Belarus has long been a coveted catch for Gazprom. The version of backroom agreements has been heated up by statements by top-managers of Gazprom itself, which made believe that the Belarusian «pipe» was basically a put-up job. However, Lukashenko's and his high-rank officials' latest statements dispersed illusions on that score. Minsk still evaluates BelTransGaz at USD 5 billion, which is unacceptable for Moscow. Besides, the Kremlin is apparently irritated by the obstinacy of the Belarusian side in discussion of the draft Constitutional Act of the Union State and its unwillingness to introduce the RF rouble as a single currency for the two countries. Observers believe that in both cases the authoritarian Belarusian ruler does not want to sacrifice a penny-weight of his individual power.

In the opinion of some experts, Russia may start seriously pressurizing Belarus. However, it will not be because of the appeal from the West and definitely not for the sake of sublime ideas of democracy, but will be conditioned by Russia's economic interests and great power aspirations. Nevertheless, the «last dictatorship in Europe» is at risk to find itself between the beetle and the block.

Vital Voronovich. 06.02.06.

SECURING INSECURITY: THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE EU'S INTERNAL SECURITY REGIME AND ITS EASTERN NEIGHBORS

The evolution of the EU amidst the continued dramatic changes in Europe and the world has been radically changing its fundamental concepts, institutions and policies. Security is one such area where the speed and scope of transformations have been most stunning. It has been steadily losing its internal/external dichotomy and while the shaping of the CFSP and the ESDP is still underway, Justice, Freedom and Security (JFS or JLS — the French acronym) that is more and more often used in place of «Justice and Home Affairs» (JHA) are acquiring an external dimension and demand enhanced cross-pillar coordination, as well as new forms and mechanisms for coping with the external environment. Internal security experienced two

parallel processes: «Europeanization» and «externalization.»¹ The latter is only a recent innovation and is therefore in its formative stage.

AN EVOLVING DIMENSION

The Treaty of Amsterdam on the European Union which came into force on 1 May 1999 stated that the EU:

- must be maintained and developed as an area of freedom, security and justice;
- (an area) in which the free movement of persons is assured;
- in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating crime.

To this effect, the October 1999 Tampere European Council (the first-ever devoted to JHA) adopted a first work program, which implementation was achieved in 2004. At the Feira European Council it was emphasized that the justice and home affairs must be «incorporated into the Union’s overall external strategy as a contribution towards the establishment of the area of freedom, security and justice.»² In 2000 an agreement was reached on general principles on external relations of JHA and a plan containing priorities for the external dimension of JHA, known as the Tampere Scoreboard. The EU’s specific objectives here are to foster political stability, economic prosperity, and the rule of law with neighboring countries. This encompasses overcoming such challenges as restoring the rule of law, controlling migratory movements and fighting organized crime. The guiding principles for the external dimension of JHA are fourfold:

- relevance in creating an area of freedom, security and justice;
- added contribution to actions already performed by Member-States;
- contribution to the general political objectives of the EU’s external policy;
- completion within a reasonable period of time.³

On 4 November 2004 the European Council adopted the Hague Programme, which set the objectives to be implemented in the period 2005–2010. The Hague Programme has a whole page on external relations where it considers the development of a coherent external dimension of the Union policy of freedom, security and justice as a «growing priority». It called for a strategy on external relations by the end of 2005. The strategy should reflect the Union’s special relations with third countries, groups of countries and regions, and focus on the specific needs for JHA cooperation with them.

¹ Anderson, Malcolm, and Apat, Joanna. *Changing Conceptions of Security and their Implications for EU Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation*. Centre for European Policy Studies. CEPS Policy Brief no. 26 (October 2002); Bigo, Didier. When two become one. Internal and external securitisations in Europe // Kelstrup, Morten S., and Williams, Michael C. (Eds). *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community*. — London–New York: Routledge, 2000.

² Santa Maria Da Feira European Council. 19 and 20 June 2000. Conclusions of the Presidency. http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/fei1_en.htm#IV

³ Justice and home affairs a key area in the European Union’s relations with third countries and international organizations. http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/external/fsj_external_intro_en.htm

All powers available to the Union, including external relations, should be used in an integrated and consistent way to establish the area of freedom, security and justice. The following guidelines should be taken into account:

- the existence of internal policies as the major parameter justifying external action;
- need for value added in relation to projects carried out by the Member States;
- contribution to the general political objectives of the foreign policies of the Union;
- possibility of achieving the goals during a period of reasonable time;
- the possibility of long-term action.⁴

The External relations and Enlargement unit has been created under the European Commission's DG JLS to ensure that the Justice and Home Affairs dimension is fully incorporated into the EU's external policy in order to spread the values of justice, freedom and security to third countries. The Justice and Home affairs component of external relations covers a broad range of themes:

- the external dimension migration policy: importance of effective control of the EU's external borders and signing readmission agreements with countries from which migratory flows originate;
- the fight against specific forms of crime such as financial crime, money laundering, corruption and trading in human beings;
- the fight against drug trafficking: the EU finances measures for preventing and fighting against drug production and trafficking in several parts of the world;
- the strengthening of non-military aspects of crisis management and security through police cooperation in crisis regions.⁵

The implementation of the Justice and Home Affairs dimension in external relations is based on a number of different tools, including:

- legal agreements with a justice, freedom and security chapter;
- bilateral and ministerial meetings;
- assistance programs;
- sub-committees;
- declarations;
- action plans.⁶

The Constitutional treaty, along with other changes, envisaged strengthening the powers of EU institutions, considerably reducing the inter-governmental character of JHA decision-making and putting in place a more co-decisional procedure. In this way it could seriously facilitate the harmonization and unification of JHA rules, procedures and policies of the mem-

⁴ Presidency Conclusions — Brussels, 4/5 November 2004. 14292/04 11. Annex I. The Hague Programme. Strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union.

⁵ Justice and Home Affairs are a key in the European Union's relations with international organizations. http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/external/international/fsj_external_organisations_en.htm

⁶ External Relations and Enlargement – DG JLS – European Commission
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/justice_home/external/dg_external_en.htm

ber-states. It could offer also a greater flexibility of actions. Under the so-called «accelerator clause» it would allow at least on-third of member states to proceed with their initiative even if it has been blocked in the Council.⁷ This treaty, however, has not gone as far as to overcome the current fragmentation of Justice and Home Affairs, which are found in all the three EU pillars.

From the functional point of view the external dimension of the area of FSJ can be discerned in the three EU policy paradigms, which are separate from one another, mutually contradictory, though not necessarily mutually exclusive but, yet again, not well-connected or coordinated (See Figure 1).




Figure 1. Three policy paradigms and their implications for external borders⁸

The current unprecedented EU enlargement coupled with constitutional and other problems and terrorist attacks have further transformed the context, in which the Union's JHA system is being shaped. The «internal» security cannot be any more confined solely to the territory of the Union and its member-states. Additionally, an ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is striving to create a «ring» of stability and prosperity (i.e. to «project» security) along the perimeter of the enlarged EU.⁹

⁷ See: Provisional consolidated version of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Council of the European Union, Brussels. <http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf>

⁸ See: Ehin, Piret. What kind of external borders for the EU? <http://ec.ut.ee/transition/External%20borders-Neighbourhood%20Policy.pdf>

⁹ See: European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper. Communication from the Commission, Brussels, 12/05/04. Also: Waever, Ole. The EU as a Security Actor. Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-sovereign security orders // Kelstrup, Morten S., and Williams, Michael C. (Eds). International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community. — London–New York: Routledge, 2000.

JHA, THE ENP AND THE “NEW” EASTERN NEIGHBORS: IS THERE A PLACE FOR A FSJ AREA?

The Union and its ENP are facing multiple security challenges on the Eastern borders. Cooperation on Justice and Home affairs with the “new” Eastern neighbors has been difficult, inefficient, lacking a systemic character or, at best, rudimentary.

Firstly, the ENP has failed to embrace Russia along with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Nevertheless, EU-Russia relations seem to be more advanced than those with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, including the area of JHA.

The EU-Russia relationship is conducted within the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement framework which established a JHA sub-committee and a JHA Permanent Partnership Council at ministerial level. High level meetings regularly take place between the Commissioner and the Presidential aide. Specific instruments to strengthen JHA cooperation have been jointly developed, such as the joint Action Plan on organized crime, and its implementation tool, the EU Liaison Officers network. Europol–Russia Cooperation Agreement concluded in November 2003 provided for a framework for cooperation on criminal matters between EU-ROPOL — the EU law enforcement organization and the Russian police. Under the TACIS technical assistance program, around €100 million has been spent on JHA projects, notably border management and support to judicial reform. The present Indicative Programme for the period 2004–06, covers judicial and law enforcement capacity building, the fight against organized crime, and terrorism, the fight against money laundering and migration issues, including support to improve the asylum system, tackle illegal migration and the issue of internally displaced people in need of protection.¹⁰

Under Justice, Freedom and Security the EU and Russia aim at preventing and combating illegal activities, such as trafficking in drugs, money-laundering, organized crime, corruption, illegal migration, trafficking in human beings and vehicle theft, as well as strengthening judicial cooperation. It also includes assistance in developing border infrastructures, upgrading customs and cross-border posts, and enhancing skills of their personnel. The European Council adopted the EU Action Plan on common action for Russia on combating organized crime in 2000.¹¹ On 10 May 2005 the EU–Russia Summit concluded with an agreement on a package of measures to create four EU/Russia «common spaces» in the fields of economy, external security, freedom, security and justice and education, research and culture. The principles, underlying the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice include democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms, including free and independent media and the effective application of common values by independent judicial systems. Work on this space provides for the adoption of agreements on readmission and visa facilitation. It encompasses cooperation on combating terrorism, organized crime and corruption. The road map for the Common Space of External Security underlines the shared responsibility of the EU and Russia for an international order based on effective multilateralism, their determina-

¹⁰ See: Common European Union strategy towards Russia in the area of justice and home affairs. http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/external/russia/fsj_external_russia_en.htm

¹¹ Justice, Freedom and Security. http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/p_223.htm

tion to co-operate to strengthen the central role of the United Nations, and promote the role and effectiveness of relevant international and regional organizations, in particular the OSCE and the Council of Europe.¹²

Meanwhile, the «roadmap» format of EU cooperation with Russia is too «fuzzy» and misses concrete actions. As Michael Emerson writes, the four common spaces are a weaker and fuzzier still derivative of the neighborhood policy, giving only token attention to democracy and excluding explicit reference to EU norms as the reference points for Russian-EU convergence. They do not really inform about where the EU and Russia are heading.¹³

Secondly, Belarus is not fully engaged and is formally excluded from the EU's cooperation on security matters due to its notorious self-isolation.¹⁴ Among the countries on which the work of the European Commission's DG JLS External relations and Enlargement unit mainly focuses are Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova, but not Belarus. At the same time, in spite of serious political tensions and the absence of an institutionalized cooperation between the EU and Belarus in the security area the latter has been a recipient (or a potential recipient) of the Union's assistance on a number of security issues.¹⁵

Belarus is not found in any of the three levels of the EU's security co-operation with third states. However its strategic ally Russia is, at least formally, positioned on the second one.¹⁶ This fact, however, does not in any way alleviate issues neither for Belarus, nor for Russia. To date, both the post-Soviet and Russia-Belarus frameworks represent more of a space of common unresolved problems, rather than a «common security space». As Russian experts observe, in addition to an inefficient cooperation among law-enforcement bodies in the Commonwealth of Independent States, in Russia itself there remain a high level of crime and corruption on all levels of power and cooperation between the Russian and Western security structures is

¹² For the texts of EU-Russia «Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security And Justice,» the «Road Map for the Common Space of External Security» and other documents see: http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/images/pText_pict/465/Press%20release.doc

¹³ Emerson, Michael. EU-Russia Four Common Spaces and the Proliferation of the Fuzzy. Centre for European Policy Studies. CEPS Policy Brief no. 71/May 2005. P. 3.

¹⁴ Country Strategy Paper. National Indicative Programme Belarus 2005–2006. Adopted by the European Commission on 28 May 2004; Pazdnyak, Vyachaslau. «Belarus in the Geopolitics of the 'New Near East': an independent variable?» // *Enlarged EU — Enlarged Neighbourhood. Perspectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy*. Ed. by Nicolas Hayoz, Leszek Jesien, and Wim van Meurs. (Interdisciplinary Studies on Central and Eastern Europe, Vol. 2). Bern: Peter Lang, 2005; Pazdnyak, Vyachaslau. Whence the Möbius strip of Belarusian Politics? [The current trends in Belarus' relations with Russia, the US, the EU, and other international institutions] // Belarus: Youth, Politics and European Perspective. Smolensk: Neoprint, 2005.

¹⁵ See: Country Strategy Paper. National Indicative Programme Belarus 2005–2006.

¹⁶ Levels of security co-operation with third States and international organisations. Council of the European Union. 14400/04. Brussels, 9 November 2004.

inadequate.¹⁷ Even between such close allies as Russia and Belarus interaction in combating new security challenges leaves much to be desired.¹⁸

Thirdly, as for the Action Plans proposed for Ukraine¹⁹ and Moldova,²⁰ those can be realistically viewed as only the initial (and, besides, conditional) steps.

Moldova and Ukraine have become the first two East European states among the first seven of the EU's neighbors to agree Action Plans that make concrete the European Union's new offer under the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Action Plans will help strengthen democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights as well as helping with economic modernization. In addition the EU is offering more targeted help to tackle cross border issues, such as migration and trafficking. In the area of security the Plans will:

- step up co-operation on border management, migration, trafficking in human beings, organized crime, money laundering and financial and economic crimes,
- increase dialogue and co-operation on counter-terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as efforts to resolve regional conflict.

The plans do not replace, but build on the existing Association or Co-operation Agreement with each partner. The further a partner is ready to go in taking practical steps to implement common values, the further the EU will be ready to go in strengthening links.²¹

Fourthly, the overall political climate in the region (a «shared» or «common» Russia–EU neighborhood imbued with various political problems, e.g. the alleged Russia's claims on a special role in it's «near abroad») is not making the situation any easier.

In addition to the ENP, bilateral and multilateral JHA-related programs, which are conducted jointly with the UN offices there are also some «umbrella» projects to embrace Western NIS. The European Commission plans to launch a pilot program in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine to offer protection to refugees and manage migration flows. The program will be aimed at providing direct assistance and protection to refugees. According to the Commission

¹⁷ Fedorov, Andrei. Home Security: Russia's Challenges. A Russian Perspective // *European Homeland Security Post-March 11th and Transatlantic Relations*. European Security Forum Working Paper No. 17. Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels — The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. October 2004. P. 25.

¹⁸ See, in particular: Pazdnyak, Vyachaslau. «EU Enlargement and Belarus: A 'Collage' of Security Spaces» // *Yevropeiskoye budushee Belarusi* [Belarus' European Future. In Russian]. Proceedings of a seminar. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Regional Bureau for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Ed. by Helmut Kurth. Minsk: Donarit, 2004; Also: Pazdnyak, Vyachaslau. *EU and Belarus: a transit of (in)security* [In Russian and in German]. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2005.

¹⁹ See: Proposed EU/Ukraine Action Plan. <http://www.delukr.cec.eu.int/files/Action%20Plan%20Text-final-website.pdf> In 2001 an Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairs and the related scoreboard were agreed between the EU and Ukraine.

²⁰ See: Proposed EU/Moldova Action Plan. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/Proposed_Action_Plan_EU-Moldova.pdf

²¹ European Neighbourhood Policy: the first Action Plans. <http://www.delukr.cec.eu.int/site/page32426.html>

spokesman, «contacts with the government will be limited to what is strictly necessary for the efficient implementation of the projects and the program will be largely carried out through cooperation with nongovernmental organizations.»²²

Meanwhile, refugees seeking asylum in the European Union dropped in number by 34 per cent from 425,520 to 282,480 between 2002 and 2004. Great Britain and France are major destinations, receiving some 60,000 asylum seekers annually each. Over the same period the number of asylum seekers in the new EU member states has grown by 21 per cent. In 2003–2004 the greatest numbers of refugees to Europe came from Russia (9, 8 per cent of the total figure).²³

TRANSIT SECURITY OF THE EU'S EASTERN NEIGHBORS: A LIMITING FACTOR FOR THE SHAPING OF A PAN-EUROPEAN INTERNAL SECURITY REGIME

A major predicament for the shaping of a Pan-European internal security regime is a specific phenomenon of transit security of some of EU's Eastern neighbors. The latter either have no immediate interest in joining the European Union or sharing its values (Belarus), or indicate their interest in membership (Ukraine and Moldova), but may approach such opportunities in a relatively remote future.

The underlying security strategy of the European Union is based on creating structural soft security conditions in its international environment. However this strategy can succeed if there is a high degree of its neighbors' engagement in cooperation short of interdependence. Being rather far away from such status, these states perform functions of «relaying» (in)security among their international counterparts: other states, corporations, international organizations and actors, including sub-state units. Besides, their strategy is that of balancing among security risks and challenges of their neighbors.

This phenomenon is not unique with regard to some particular state and cannot be reduced to a sum of geopolitical, geo-economic or civilizational characteristics — geographical position at the juncture of or in between powerful political, economic, and/or civilizational centers, which are connected by mutually needed exchanges and interdependence.

Additionally, the states under discussion are typologically transitive. They have not yet finalized their political and economic model or have not yet made a definitive choice in favor of one or the other neighboring power centers. This reproduces ambivalence of national interests, identities and international subjectivity, which may manifest in contradictory relationships with neighbors.

A state pursuing a «transit security» policy relays, in addition to its own risks and challenges, those of its counterparts. This is being done not only in a «physical» form, but also through discourses²⁴: via diplomatic, political, economic, informational (including the mass media) means, and also in various situations of group and individual encounters at the professional (state bureaucracies, business, culture, etc.) or ordinary people-to-people levels.

22 EU to launch pilot refugee protection programme in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova. 14/09/2005 <http://www.charter97.org/eng/news/2005/09/14/progr>

23 Ibid.




Figure 2. A Transit (In)security Model: receiving/accumulation/transformation/relaying

Therefore, an aggregated politico-informational space of a transit state is constantly generating various implications of transit challenges and risks, or, otherwise, is constructing them (See Figure 2.). In this sense security transit is simultaneously creating and destroying regional security complexes.

CONCLUSIONS

Globalization and the resultant impetus it has given to non-traditional transnational threats need flexible responses. To fight these «new» threats, a global enforcement regime has been created. At the UN and G8 level conventions against transnational organized crime and regulations to counter money laundering are accepted, while the UN Security Council has set in motion a global program against international terrorism. The wide array of multilateral agreements, conventions, rules and regulations on drugs, crime, money laundering and terrorism are reached at inter-governmental level (such as the UN, G8, the EU) and presented as a *fait accompli* before national parliaments that are pressured to ratify them. No government wants to be labeled as an outcast because a national parliament refuses to ratify these international agreements that are the result of complicated diplomatic bargaining and an alleged international consensus. At the level of the European Union a similar process is taking place in order to harmonize its justice and security area. Critics are saying that there are few mechanisms in place to evaluate the effectiveness or adverse effects of this regime, nor does it take any account of the root causes or grievances of those who have opposed the *status quo*. They emphasize the need to promote an alternative agenda to realign the focus of ‘security’ from enforcement and repression towards a «human security» agenda that looks to root causes and social solutions and puts more emphasis on good governance, social and economic development and human rights.²⁵

In October 2005 the European Commission adopted a strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice specifically addressing the task of engaging

²⁴ From the vantage point of social constructivism a communicative action is a rhetorical action. See, for example: Risse, Thomas. «Let’s Argue: Communicative Action in World Politics» // *International Organization*. Vol. 54. No. 1. Winter 2000. P. 1–39; Müller, Harald. «International Relations as Communicative Action» // Fierke, Karin M., Jørgensen, Knud Erik. *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*. — Armonk, New York — London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2001. Pp. 160–178.

the EU on these matters with third countries worldwide. The new Strategy outlines the main external challenges facing the area of freedom, security and justice identifies the objectives of the EU's external actions in this field, the issues to be addressed worldwide, the instruments at the EU's disposal and the principles for selecting appropriate actions, outlines how the strategy could be applied by geographic area and makes some recommendations to facilitate its implementation.²⁶ The document makes it a point that the projection of the values underpinning the area of freedom, security and justice is essential in order to safeguard the internal security of the Union. Thus, a further elaboration of the external dimension of the FSJ is making it more «inclusive» in the sense that there will be a smaller distinction between the internal and external meaning and application of the EU's concept of freedom, which is based on internal security provided through effective law enforcement and access to justice.²⁷

This, however, is sharpening the contrast between the EU and several FSU formations, which have declared similar goals in their integration efforts: the Russia–Belarus «Union State,» the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC), the Single Economic Space (SES), and, eventually, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). All of them agreed on the «four freedoms» as cornerstones of their conceptual documents and policy goals. Nevertheless, these «freedoms» are more of a «functional» or «technical» character²⁸ and do not match the EU *acquis*, least of all its *acquis* of JHA. This, in particular, refers to such EU priorities as human rights and strengthening institutions and good governments²⁹ — issues of great concern in the case of Belarus and other FSU states.

A brief analysis suggests that prospects for an early emergence of a European internal security regime (a regime of European governance for freedom, security and justice with its effective external dimension)³⁰ are rather dim. Under the present circumstances, one can observe a «collage» of security spaces³¹ between the EU and Eastern Europe, rather than an emerging Pan-European internal security regime. A further strengthening of elements of a «global enforcement regime,» some of which are already in place, may help to build support for the realization of a more distant goal. This, again, underscores the importance of the EU's strategic concept of effective multilateralism.³²

Vyachaslau Pazdnyak – Wider Europe Review. Vol. 2. No. 3 (Summer 2005).

²⁵ Global Enforcement Regimes. Transnational Organised Crime, International Terrorism and Money Laundering. TNI Crime and Globalisation seminar. Amsterdam, 28–29 April, 2005. Transnational Institute. <http://www.tni.org/crime>

²⁶ Communication from the Commission a strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice. Commission of the European Communities Brussels, 12.10.2005 COM(2005) 491 final http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0491en01.pdf

²⁷ See: Monar, Jörg. «An Emerging Regime of European Governance for Freedom, Security and Justice.» ESRC «One Europe or Several?» Programme Briefing Note 2/99, November 1999. Monar, Jörg. «Justice and Home Affairs in a Wider Europe: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion.» ESRC «One Europe or Several?» Programme Working Paper 07/00. <http://www.one-europe.ac.uk/pdf/monarW7.PDF>

²⁸ See, for example: Kontseptsiya formirovaniya Yedinogo ekonomicheskogo prostranstva [The Concept of shaping a Single economic space. In Russian], 19 September 2003.

²⁹ Communication from the Commission. A strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice. P. 6.

³⁰ For a conceptualization of a European internal security regime see: Monar, Jörg. “An Emerging Regime of European Governance for Freedom, Security and Justice.”

³¹ See: Pazdnyak, Vyachaslau. “EU Enlargement and Belarus: A ‘Collage’ of Security Spaces // Yevropeiskoye buduschee Belarusi [Belarus’ European Future. In Russian]. Proceedings of a seminar. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Regional Bureau for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Ed. by Helmut Kurth. Minsk: Donarit, 2004; Also: Pazdnyak, Vyachaslau. EU and Belarus: a transit of (in)security [In Russian and in German]. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2005.

³² See: Communication from the Commission a strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice, and .Solana, Javier. A secure Europe in a better world. Document adopted at the European Council in Brussels, 12 December 2003. Paris: The EU Institute for Security Studies (December 2003).

DIVERSIFICATION OF BELARUSIAN EXPORTS THROUGH BALTIC PORTS

The Government of Belarus resolved to transfer part of cargo traffic from the Ventspils seaport to that of Klaipeda

Sergey Sidorski, Prime Minister of Belarus, announced in the course of his meeting with Petras Vaitekiusas, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Lithuanian Republic to Belarus, that it had been resolved to transfer part of cargo traffic from the Ventspils seaport to that of Klaipeda. This became the result of the efforts undertaken by Vilnius, which over the past years had been pursuing a consistent strategy on attracting an increasingly larger share of Belarusian exports through the Klaipeda seaport. For Minsk it became an advantageous option in view of the increasing threat of economic sanctions on the part of the European Union. It also could be a leverage to influence the policy of Riga, regarded in Minsk as non-amicable, which ostentatiously supports the Belarusian opposition.

«We have very good relations with the seaport of Klaipeda. Belarusian cargo currently covers over 25% of the Klaipeda seaport traffic,» the head of the Belarusian Government remarked during the meeting with Lithuanian Ambassador. To quote him, a decision was taken to transfer additional 100 thousand tons of cargo to the Klaipeda seaport from Ventspils. «Belarus accounts for over 20 million tons of cargo,» Sergey Sidorski said, emphasizing that the Klaipeda seaport needs to compete against those of Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg, and Nikolayev. So far this statement by Belarusian Prime Minister has received no comments from Moscow.

The head of the Belarusian Government also expressed his satisfaction with the development of trade and economic cooperation with Lithuania. «It is very important that Lithuanian businessmen are happy with the investment environment in Belarus», Sergey Sidorski stated, accentuating that Belarus has «one of the best and most transparent investment codes.» «The existing problems are contrived. Those who want to work confirm this,» believes Belarusian Prime Minister.